










A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the 
 




The Faculty of Energy Systems and Nuclear Science 
 









 Fault trees and event trees have been widely accepted as the modeling strategy to 
perform Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA). However, there are several limitations 
associated with fault tree/event tree modeling. These include 1. It only considers binary 
events; 2. It assumes independence among basic events; and 3. It does not consider 
timing sequence of basic events. This thesis investigates Petri net modeling as a potential 
alternative for PRA modeling. Petri nets have mainly been used as a simulation tool for 
queuing and network systems. However, it has been suggested that they could also model 
failure scenarios, and thus could be a potential modeling strategy for PRA. In this thesis, 
the transformations required to model logic gates in a fault tree by Petri nets are explored. 
The gap between fault tree analysis and Petri net analysis is bridged through gate 
equivalency analysis.  Methods for qualitative and quantitative analysis for Petri nets are 
presented. Techniques are developed and implemented to revise and tailor traditional 
Petri net modeling for system failure analysis. The airlock system and the maintenance 
cooling system of a CANada Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) reactor are used as case 
studies to demonstrate Petri nets ability to model system failure and provide a structured 
approach for qualitative and quantitative analysis. The minimal cutsets and the 
probability of the airlock system failing to maintain the pressure boundary are obtained. 
Furthermore, the case study is extended to non-coherent system analysis due to system 
maintenance. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
  
1.1 Historical Background 
 
Nuclear power plants are highly regulated from design, construction, operation, and 
decommissioning. Engineers must comply with stringent regulations to limit the risk of 
radioactivity released to the public. The objectives of nuclear safety are to operate in a safe 
manner, protect the public and environment, limit the release of radioactive material in the event 
of a design basis accident, and adhere to the rules and regulations. 
 A deterministic approach attempts to ensure that the plausible accident scenarios are 
taken into account, and that the monitoring systems and safety systems will be capable to contain 
the accident and prevent the release of radioactive material. This approach is based on two 
principles referred to as the leak tight barrier and the concept of Defense-in-Depth [USNRC, 
1980]. 
 Leak tight barriers consist of fuel cladding; the primary reactor coolant system; and the 
containment building between the radioactive source and the public. 
 Defense-in-Depth assumes accidents may still occur from equipment failures and human 
factors despite engineering design safety, and therefore systems are designed and installed to 
limit the consequences for both the public and environment. Defense-in-Depth incorporates 
several stages including: prevention and surveillance, protection, and safeguard.  
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When the Three Mile Island accident occurred in 1979, it became apparent that the 
deterministic approach had its limitations and how safety assessment techniques should be 
required. The recommendations made after was to incorporate probabilistic analysis techniques 
in conjunction with conventional deterministic approaches. The Rasmussen report was the first 
of its kind to assess the potential risk of core damage for nuclear power reactors [WASH-1400 
1975]. 
 The accident at Chernobyl in 1986 revealed the potential consequences of failure to 
manage nuclear power plant safety. This revealed the urgent need to develop a sustainable 
probabilistic safety and risk program for accident prevention. Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
(PRA) and safety assessments have seen much attention and development since, and are now an 
integral part of nuclear power plant operation and design [Kessides, 2012]. 
PRA safety assessments were developed to calculate the probability of failure events for 
complex nuclear and aerospace engineering systems. Modeling techniques such as fault tree 
analysis and event tree analysis have been widely used to develop scenarios for simulating 
hypothetical accidents, and estimate the frequency of failure or accidents.  
1.2 Problem Statement 
The modeling technique to perform PRA should consist of the abilities to perform both 
qualitative and quantitative analysis, allow dependence among basic events, simulate various 
scenarios, model coherent and non-coherent systems, and a graphical user interface.  
 Fault trees and event trees have been widely accepted as the modeling technique to 
perform PRA. However, there are several limitations associated with the traditional modeling 
methods. These include  
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1. It only considers binary events;  
2. It assumes independence among basic events;  
3. It does not consider timing sequence of basic events; and  
4. No graphical user interface for simulation.  
Ignoring these limitations constrains the accuracy of the PRA and results in analysis that over-
simplifies scenarios and models [Marhavila et al, 2011]. 
1.3 Objective of the Thesis 
 Petri nets are most commonly used for work flow management such as: manufacturing, 
control systems, and queuing applications. Petri nets have two analysis methods: the reachability 
method and the algebraic method. These methods are used to determine properties of discrete 
event systems such as: reachability, liveliness, safeness, boundedness and stability, conservation, 
and controllability. These system properties are essential for system analysis for areas such as 
manufacturing, real-time processing, computer architecture, dynamic control, supervisory control, 
and material handling [Peterson, 1981,]. There has been limited work surrounding its ability to 
provide a structured approach to determine the probability of failure in a complex system. Petri 
nets have mainly been used as a simulation tool for queuing and network systems. However, it 
has been suggested that they could also model failure scenarios, and thus be a potential modeling 
strategy for PRA [Liu, 1997].  
Currently, the most widely accepted modeling technique used in the nuclear industry to 
determine probability of failure in a complex system is the fault tree analysis and event tree 
analysis. They are used to identify and evaluate the sequence of events in a potential accident 
scenario, following the occurrence of an initiating event. The objective of the thesis is to 
introduce Petri net as a potential alternative analysis technique for PRA.  
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Objective 1, investigate Petri net modeling as a potential alternative modeling strategy for 
PRA by determining the gaps between Petri net modeling and traditional fault tree modeling, and 
bridging the gaps. Objective 2, construct a Petri net model of the CANDU Airlock system, and 
apply qualitative and quantitative methodologies, and verify their results. Objective 3, software 
development to address limitations with current traditional Petri net software packages for 
system failure modeling.  
1.4 Organization of the Thesis 
 
This thesis comprises of five chapters. The present chapter introduces objectives and 
contributions of the thesis. 
 The second chapter presents the literature review which provides the fundamental 
definitions related to the modeling of a system by Petri nets. Petri net analysis techniques are 
introduced, and their advantages of limitations are discussed. A brief survey of safety programs; 
specifically PRA and the current modeling techniques (mainly fault tree and event tree), are also 
provided.  
 Chapter three describes the methodologies for Petri net techniques as an alternative 
modeling tool for PRA. The behaviours and interactions between system components, and 
construction techniques for a structured model to perform qualitative and quantitative analysis 
are explored. Petri nets and analysis software are introduced and discussed. 
 In chapter four, application of Petri net for PRA modeling and analysis of systems in a 
CANDU reactor is demonstrated. Two cases are studied. In case study 1, the airlock system 
includes interfaces with mechanical, electrical, and operation factors, and the system is coherent.  
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Case study 2 explores a non-coherent system analysis when the primary heat transport system is 
undergoing maintenance and the maintenance cooling system is active. 
 Conclusions are given in the last chapter. The scope of Petri nets for PRA is discussed. 
This chapter also includes recommendations for future research. 
1.5 Major Contributions 
 
This thesis demonstrates Petri nets as a viable modeling tool for Probabilistic Risk 
Assessment. This is established through the modeling and analysis techniques for fault models 
through utilization of logic functions which provide a structured approach to analysis. Petri net 
models are developed for PRA analysis and simulation. Select CANDU systems are used to 
demonstrate the techniques introduced in the thesis, with results verified by fault tree analysis. 
Also, software development is presented for improved Petri net simulation for system failure 
analysis.  
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
   
 The initial consideration of safety issues began with the Manhattan Project during World 
War II. During the construction process, there were disputes over safety issues which led to 
engineers dividing the reactor design into smaller, relatively independent sub-systems, thus 
allowing any dependent systems to be designed. This is the concept of functional and structural 
independence, which we know today as Defense-in-Depth. The concept of Defense-in-Depth 
originated in the 1940’s, and was dominated by the lack of precise knowledge of design margins 
which evolved into a set of regulatory design and safety principles: [Rhodes, 1986] 
1. Use of multiple active and/or passive engineered barriers to rule out any single failures 
leading to the release of radioactive materials. 
2. Incorporation of large design margins to overcome any lack of precise knowledge 
(epistemic uncertainty) about capacity of barriers and magnitude of challenges imposed 
by normal or accident conditions. 
3. Application of quality assurance in design and manufacturing. 
4. Operation within predetermined safe design limits. 
5. Continuous testing, inspections, and maintenance to preserve original design margins. 
To measure the effectiveness and performance of the safety systems, deterministic 
approaches were used through conservative assumptions and calculations. The concept of 
“design basis accidents” was developed to measure the effectiveness of the barriers and 
safety systems. Based on Design Basis Accidents (DBA), safety was defined as the 
ability of a nuclear reactor to withstand a fixed set of prescribed accident scenarios which 
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would be the most significant adverse events in a nuclear power plant. The premise was 
that if a plant could handle the DBA, it could handle any other accidents. As part of 
Defense-in-Depth, multiple back-up equipment and redundancies in safety design is 
required. 
 In 1956, the first comprehensive study of the consequences of a large nuclear accident, 
WASH-740 was published by the AEC. The purpose of this document was to aid congress to 
deliberate on the Price-Anderson Act regarding the potential harms of reactor accidents, and to 
provide government insurance for private nuclear reactors. WASH-740 estimated the risk for a 
serious reactor accident as 10
-6
 per reactor’s year of operation, which is still used for estimations 
of large, early releases of radiation due to reactor accidents today. The study focused on the 
dangers of large Loss of Coolant Accidents (LOCAs) as the leading source of radiation released 
into the environment. In 1967, AEC realized that under some circumstances, the containment 
building may fail. The key to protect the health and safety of the public was shifted to prevent 
accidents severe enough to threaten containment. In 1974, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC) was created to replace the AEC due to conflicts of interest to promote and regulate the 
nuclear program [Ford, 1977]. The NRC is responsible for civilian nuclear power regulation and 
assuring the protection of the health and safety of the public. 
In 1972, Senator John O. Pastore helped initiate the Reactor Safety Study (RSS), also 
known as the Rasmussen Report (WASH-1400), with the purpose of extending the Price-
Anderson Act, and also to ease public concerns over the nuclear technology and licensing which 
were seen as inadequate and inconsistent with respect to the apparent safety significance of 
various systems, structures, and components within the plant. Fault trees were the main tools 
used to develop almost all of the major safety related systems but it was realized that integrating 
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fault tree analysis for the entire plant was too complex, given time and resource constraints. This 
led to the development of the event tree concept to model the time-line of the possible accidents 
scenarios.  
The WASH-1400 analyzed six specific LOCAs: 
1. Large pipe breaks (3” to 6” in diameter) 
2. Small/intermediate pipe breaks (2” to 6” in diameter) 
3. Small pipe breaks (less than 2” in diameter) 
4. Large disruptive reactor vessel ruptures 
5. Gross steam generator ruptures 
6. Ruptures in systems that interface with the reactor coolant system 
Besides LOCAs, the RSS investigated several types of reactor transients as possible 
initiating events for reactor system failures. The RSS defined transient as any significant 
deviation from the normal operating value of any of the key reactor operating parameters 
including all non-LOCA situations that could lead to fuel heat imbalances. Transients could 
occur from a variety of means, such as equipment failure or human error. Transients were 
divided into two categories, anticipated, such as loss of off-site power, and unanticipated, such as 
reactor vessel rupture.  
Following the modeling and analysis of the reactor during an accident, an analysis was 
completed for the potential radiation release from the reactor into the containment and into the 
environment. Once the radiation release was known, the consequences of expected human, 
economic, and environmental loss could be estimated. The RSS showed that most accidents that 
led to radiation release would only have small consequences.  
 9 
2.1 Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
In 1975, the WASH-1400 [NUREG-75/014, 1975] was published on the Surry and Peach 
Bottom nuclear power plants. After publication of WASH-1400, the probabilities and 
consequences of nuclear plant accidents had been adequately addressed and that, as a technology, 
those risks were very small. However, the critical review by the Lewis Committee in 1978 
[NUREG/CR-0400, 1978], and by others [NRC, 1979] in 1979, raised serious questions about 
the uncertainties surrounding the numerical assessment of risk, which prompted the commission 
to issue its somewhat cautious policy statement on the WASH-1400 report and on the future use 
of PRA in the regulation of nuclear power. One of the concerns was the use of lognormal 
distribution to model the probability of failure uncertainties [NUREG/CR-0400, 1978]. Though 
the committee indicated this problem, they did not have a better solution on how to account for 
the 10-1000 fold uncertainties in failure probabilities due to limited data. The comments by the 
Lewis Committee and others was that despite the risks being small, the uncertainties were large 
and pervasive – mostly due to questions regarding proper modeling of the accident sequences, 
lack of understanding of the phenomenology of the progression of accidents involving severe 
core degradation or core melt, completeness, and the lack of an adequate database for very low 
probability but high consequence accidents. The committee concluded that the RSS accident 
probabilities were not considered reliable for the overall risk of reactor accidents [US NRC, 
1978]. 
 Following the Lewis Committee Report of 1978, the NRC withdrew its support of the 
RSS results and disavowed the Executive Summary. Around this time, the accident at Three Mile 
Island (TMI) Unit 2 occurred in March 1979. This event indicated that major accidents not 
addressed in the formal reactor licensing process were possible, and that new approaches to 
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nuclear regulation were required [US NRC, 1978]. The RSS had considered a similar sequence 
of events and showed that this sequence was not among the risk-significant contributors for that 
reactor design. The TMI accident confirmed a major RSS insight that small LOCAs are more 
risk-significant than the large LOCAs, which the NRC used as a design basis accident for worst-
case LOCAs in licensing reactors. The RSS also pointed out the potential role of human error, 
which was a huge significance in the TMI accident when operators turned off the ECCS. As a 
result, the NRC restored all papers and documents to reference the RSS. 
After the TMI accident, the NRC began to devote additional resources towards the 
expansion of PRA use in the industry. During 1979-1982, the NRC undertook two sets of follow-
up PRA studies. The Reactor Safety Study Methodology Application Program (RSSMAP) was 
to apply the RSS methodology to additional reactor designs [NUREG/CR-1659, 1981], and the 
Interim Reliability Evaluation Program (IREP) [NUREG/CR-1659, 1981], was a planned multi-
plant reliability evaluation program to develop and standardize the reliability methodology 
involved in performing reliability and safety studies. In 1983, the NUREG/CR-2300 PRA 
procedures guide was published. In 1990, the NRC provided additional guidance regarding 
frequency of core damage accidents and Large Early Release of Radioactivity Frequency (LERF) 
[NUREG/CR-1659, 1981]. The numerical value of Core Damage Frequency (CDF) is one in ten 
thousand and LERF is one in one hundred thousand. These values later evolved into the 
benchmark values of 10
-4
 for CDF and 10
-5
 for LERF. By 1995, the use of PRAs had been well 
established in the nuclear industry and as a result the NRC issued its PRA policy statement 
directing that the NRC staff use PRA for all regulatory matters to the extent supported. 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment represents a comprehensive and disciplined model of plant 
performance, including interactions between systems and operations. Through the modeling and 
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subsequent quantification of success and failure paths, a number of potential weaknesses in plant 
design, operations, surveillance interval testing, and maintenance procedures can be identified. 
The PRA methodologies can be effectively used within the nuclear industry and supplement 
engineering evaluation techniques to enhance safety and improve plant availability.  
Probabilistic Risk Assessment attempts to quantify the probabilities and consequences 
associated with accidents and malfunctions by applying probability and statistical techniques and 
consequence-evaluation methods deemed acceptable amongst technologists. It requires all 
available information and widens the historic basis by using data not only for accidents but also 
for plant or equipment failures which have not led to accidents. One of the important features of 
PRA is the taxonomy and comprehensiveness with which potential accidents are analyzed. In the 
case of nuclear power, it usually begins with a fault-tree/event-tree analysis of the significant 
ways in which a plant might fail.  A wide spectrum of pertinent accident consequences are then 
analyzed for potential damage to the public or the plant itself. After the models are developed, 
the second stage of PRA assigns probabilities of failure for equipment, human actions and their 
interfaces, and quantifies the consequences of these failures. A measure of the risk associated 
with the accidents and malfunctions is the curve of probability versus consequences from which 
various risk parameters can be obtained. 
The advantage of the PRA methodology is that it employs a systematic analysis of 
accident sequences in which system failures, equipment failures, and human errors are 
considered in the context of their contribution to overall risk. After the accident sequences are 
constructed, accident probabilities and consequences can be estimated, and contributions to 
quantitative risk can be measured. Methodologies of PRA have improved the understanding of 
the effects of multiple, dependent (common-cause) failures on the reliability of nuclear reactor 
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systems. By using the PRA approach, analysts are able to better understand the contributions of 
various accident sequences and risks, thus resulting in early identification of additional safety 
features, nuclear grade equipment, improved reliability, or re-engineering.  
The use of PRAs will not eliminate the need for properly designed safety features, the use 
of engineering safety criteria, safety margins, or Defense-in-Depth. The PRA will however allow 
nuclear operators to determine weakness within a safety system and properly allocate resources 
to correct potential safety concerns. 
2.1.1 Fault Tree Analysis 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) was developed by H.A. Watson of Bell Laboratories while in 
a contract with the U.S. Air Force to study the Minuteman launch control system. Since its 
discovery in the 60’s, FTA has been applied to many applications in the nuclear industry. 
Traditional FTA has always had a crucial limitation which is the ability to evaluate fault trees 
when a system is too large and the number of states become overwhelming; much like the 
massive systems in a nuclear power plant. Limitations in the 60-80’s were computer processing 
speeds. Thanks to the technological advances in microprocessor technology, they no longer pose 
a problem for this type of analysis [Zouakia et al, 1999].   
 Fault trees are useful for analyzing complex components and systems, especially in 
identifying system interrelationships such as shared support systems and common-cause failure 
mechanisms in highly redundant systems. A fault tree provides a structured approach to 
determining the probability of failure in a complex system. This approach also illustrates the 
minimum set of events that can cause the failure of a system. In order to evaluate the industrial 
risk, it is necessary to have an estimation of the accidents probability. This estimation can be 
obtained from historical data of previous accidents, or more precisely, from the application of the 
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FTA. The analysis is restrained in a particular undesired event (accident or incident) defined as 
the top event. It is operated by means of graphic modeling allowing the visualization of the 
possible combinations of malfunction and wrong actions that can generate it. The synthesis of 
the results is generally presented in a graphical model organized by the logic of the Boolean 
algebra and its symbols [Nivoliannitou et al, 2004]. 
 The basic elements of a fault tree are the same regardless of the types of events or 
systems being analyzed, therefore a standard terminology and a set of symbols have been 
developed to represent the events and operations as shown in Table 1[IEEE Std 352, 1987]. 
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Table 1 Fault Tree Symbols [Barlow & Proschan, 1975] 
Event Symbols   
 
Basic Event The circle is used to represent 
basic events in a fault tree. It is 
the lowest level of resolution in 
the fault tree. 
 
Intermediate Event Top event and intermediate 
events: The rectangle is used to 
represent the TOP event and 
any intermediate fault events in 
a fault tree. The TOP event is 
the accident that is being 
analyzed. Intermediate events 
are system states or occurrences 
that somehow contribute to the 
accident. 
 
Undeveloped Event The diamond is used to 
represent human errors and 
events that are not further 









Table 2 Fault Tree Symbols [Barlow & Proschan, 1975] (Cont’d) 
 
Conditioning Event The oval is used to represent a 
conditioning event – conditions 
that restrict or affect logic gates 
Gate Symbols   
 
 
AND Gate The event in the rectangle is the 
output event of the AND gate 
below the rectangle. The output 
event associated with this gate 
exists only if all of the input 
events exist simultaneously 
 
OR Gate The event in the rectangle is the 
output event of the OR gate 
below the rectangle. The output 
event associated with this gate 
exists if at least one of the input 
events exists.  
 
 
 The procedure for performing a fault tree analysis consists of the following eight steps 
[IEEE Std 352, 1987]: 
1. Define the system of interest: Specify and clearly define the boundaries and initial 
conditions of the system for which failure information is needed. 
2. Define the TOP event for the analysis: Specify the problem of interest that the analyst 
will address. This may be a specific quality problem, shutdown, or safety issue. 
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3. Define the treetop structure: Determine the events and conditions that most directly lead 
to the TOP event. 
4. Explore each branch in successive levels of detail: Determine the events and conditions 
that most directly lead to each intermediate event. Repeat the process at each successive 
level of the tree until the fault tree model is complete. 
5. Solve the fault tree for the combinations of events contributing to the TOP event: 
Examine the fault tree model to identify all the possible combinations of events and 
conditions that can cause the TOP event of interest. A combination of events and 
conditions sufficient and necessary to cause the TOP event is called a minimal cutset.  
6. Identify important dependent failure potentials and adjust the model appropriately. Study 
the fault tree model and the list of minimal cutsets to identify potentially important 
dependencies among events. Dependencies are single occurrences that may cause 
multiple events or conditions to occur at the same time. This step is qualitative common-
cause failure analysis. 
7. Perform quantitative analysis: Use statistical characterizations regarding the failure and 
repair of specific events and conditions in the fault-tree model to predict future 
performance for the system. 
8. Use the results in decision-making: Use results of the analysis to identify the most 
significant vulnerabilities in the system and to make effective recommendations for 
reducing the risks associated with those vulnerabilities. 
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2.1.2 Limitations of Fault Tree Analysis 
The thesis will only explore the role of traditional FTA and will not consider any 
dynamic elements. Despite the wide acceptance of fault tree techniques, traditional fault trees are 
hampered in their application by several problems. Traditional fault tree techniques treat only 
binary states. That is, fault trees can address only whether the system is completely failed or 
completely functional. A single fault tree is incapable of addressing degraded states of the 
system. The traditional fault tree technique is unable to handle any but the simplest models of 
repair. Fault tree techniques are incapable of handling the continuous change of state of 
components between failed and un-failed. Fault tree techniques are incapable of adequately 
modeling sophisticated testing schemes for reactor protection systems. Also, fault trees are 
considered very complicated and difficult, are time-consuming in its application, and expensive 
[Marhavila et al, 2011]. 
2.1.3 Risk Importance Measures 
 Importance analysis is a part of the system quantification process which enables the 
analyst to rank the contribution that each component provides to system failure in order to 
identify the weakest area of the system. Once the weakest area is known, efforts can be 
concentrated to improve their reliability. Importance measures assign a numerical value between 
0 and 1 to each system component; where 1 signifies the highest level of importance. Measures 
of importance can be categorized as either deterministic or probabilistic. Deterministic measures 
assess the importance of a component without considering component reliability. A deterministic 
measure is suited for the development stages when relevant information is limited. Probabilistic 
measure of importance can be thought of as a measurement for contributing to failure frequency 
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or contributing to failure probability. An analyst must make the clear distinction of the types of 
importance measurements which are relevant to their system, equipment or operation. The 
following are some importance measurements used for PRA: 
1. Birnbaum’s measure – Birnbaum’s measure is the probabilistic measure of component 
reliability importance. It is the probability that a component is critical to system failure 
and equals the probability that the system is residing in a critical state for a component 
such that its failure causes system failure [Birnbaum, 1969]. 
2. Component Criticality Measure – The component criticality measure is the probability 
that the component I is critical to the system when the component I has failed, weighted 
by the system unavailability at time t. These measurements consist of a failure and repair 
importance.  
a. The failure importance equals the probability that component I is fail critical to 
the system. 
b. The repair importance equals the probability that component I is success critical 
to the system. 
3. Fussell-Vesely (FV) – Importance measure of component importance is concerned with 
component failures contributing to system failure. This measurement is defined as the 
probability that a minimal cutset containing component I can cause the system failure. 
4. A component failure can contribute to system failure in the following ways: 
a. Initiating event whereby its occurrence may cause system failure. 
b. Enabling event whereby its existence permits another initiator event to potentially 
cause system failure.  
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Initiator and Enabler Importance – Measures of Initiator and Enabler importance analyzes 
the role of component failures in causing and contributing to system failures. They are 
both concerned with the sequence of events leading to system failure.  
Barlow and Parschan initiator importance is concerned with the failure of components 
acting as initiating events and thus their occurrence coincides with system failure. This measure 
calculates the probability that component I causes system failure between time at 0 and t [Barlow 
& Parschan, 1975].  
 Lambert Enabler Importance is the probability that a failure of component I allows 
system failure between time 0 and t, caused by the failure of another component j occurring. 
Where I is the enabler and j is the initiator [Lambert, 1975]. 
2.2 Petri Net 
 Carl Adam Petri defined the Petri net theory in his doctoral thesis titled “Communication 
with Automata” as a general purpose mathematical tool for describing relations existing between 
conditions and events [Petri, 1962]. Petri net Theory has developed since and is now considered 
one of the most powerful tools for the modeling of systems exhibiting concurrency, 
synchronization, and repair characteristics. As a graphical tool, Petri nets can be used as a visual-
communication aid similar to flow charts, block diagrams, and networks. Petri nets have been 
modified to model and analyze systems in different application areas such as manufacturing, 
real-time processing, computer architecture, dynamic control, supervisory control, and material 
handling.  
 The Petri net is a directed graph consisting of two types of nodes called places and 
transitions. Weighted and directed arcs connect places to transitions or vice versa. Systems are 
modeled as a set of conditions and events. Petri nets modeling conditions representing system 
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states include: top failure state and intermediate system states; which contribute to the accident. 
Events represent failures which trigger new conditions to occur. Places represent conditions and 
transitions represent events. Transitions have a set of input and output places which represent the 
preconditions and post-conditions of the transition. The state of a net is modeled by the presence 
or absence of a token in the places. The tokens in a place are referred to as the marking of the 
place. The initial marking represents the initial condition or state of the net. The states change by 
the firing of transitions which depicts the events occurring. An event occurs only when the 
preconditions are met and is represented by an enabled transition. The firing of a transition 
changes the marking of its input and output places, representing a change in its preconditions and 
post-conditions [Bowden et al, 2000]. A Petri net can be formally defined by the following two 
methods: 
Definition 2.1: (Petri Net) [W. Reisig, 1985] A Petri net is a five tuple structure defined as: 
Petri net = {P, T, Wpt, Wtp,M(0)}, 
where, 
P = {p1,p2,…,pn}- a finite set of places, and n ≥ 0  
T = {t1, t2,…,tn} – a finite set of transitions, and n ≥ 0  
There are two weight functions, Wpt and Wtp, which attach a positive integer weight to each arc 
of the net connecting places to transitions (pt) and transitions to places (tp), respectively.  
The initial marking is represented by M (0) = [m1 (0), m2 (0), … mn(0)]
T
 and is a function 
from the set of places to non-negative integers. The marking at an arbitrary time instant k is 
represented as M (k) = [m1(k), m2(k), … mn(k)]
T
 and can also be referred to as the number of 
tokens in each place. 
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[Enabled transition]: Transition t is enabled if each input place p of t is marked with at 
least W(p,t) tokens. Where W(p,t) is the arc weight between place p and transition t. 
[Firing of transition]: An enabled transition t will fire if the event that it represents occurs. 
In that case i) W(p,t) tokens are removed from each input place p of t, and ii) W(t,p) tokens are 
added in each output place p of t. 
Definition 2.2: Authors have also defined the Petri net as a six tuple structure [T. Murata, 1989]: 
PN = {P, T, I, O, M, m0}  
Where, 
P = {p1,p2,…,pn}- a finite set of places, and n ≥ 0  
T = {t1, t2,…,tn} – a finite set of transitions, and n ≥ 0  
I: PxT{0,1} – an input incidence matrix that relates places to transitions,  
O: TxP{0,1} – an output incidence matrix that relates transitions to places  
M: I, O  {1,2,3,…} – is a weight function  
m0 – The initial marking is represented by M (0) = [m1 (0), m2 (0), … mn(0)]
T
 and is a function 
from the set of places to the non-negative integers. The marking at an arbitrary time instant k is 
represented as M (k) = [m1(k), m2(k), … mn(k)]
T
 and can also be referred to as the number of 
tokens in each place. 
These two definitions of Petri net are both acceptable and widely used. The conversation 
equations between the two forms of definitions are: 
Wpt = [Wpitj],  
Where Wpitj = I(Pi, Tj) and  
Wtp = [Wtjpi]  
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Where Wtjpi = O (Tj, Pi). Wpt and Wtp are called input and output incidence matrices.  
[Peterson, 1981][ David et al, 1992] 
2.2.1 Petri Net Construction 
The most recognizable advantage of Petri net modeling is the graphical representation. It 
allows for users to easily understand and display the formal theory. Places and transitions are 
represented by circles and bars, respectively. Arcs are shown by arrows and tokens by black dots 
inside the places. Arc weights are represented by numbers placed by the arc, and an absence of 
the weight indicates a weight equal to one. The graphical construction of a Petri net involves the 
understanding of how places, transitions, tokens, and arcs interact. 
The following describes in more detail the four basic elements of Petri nets: places, 
transitions, tokens and arcs [Chiou, 1997]. 
 : Place, drawn as a circle, denotes a condition in the process. 
 : Transition, drawn as a bar, represents changes in the model. Transitions can be 
immediate, deterministically time-delayed, or time-delayed based on a probability 
distribution defined by the user.  
: Arc, drawn as an arrow, determines the path that tokens take throughout the model. Arcs can 
either enable or inhibit movement in the model depending on their use. 
: Token, drawn as a dot and contained in places, represents objects in the model. In graphical 
user interface (GUI) applications, tokens are represented as black solid circles and in more 
sophisticated applications such as color Petri nets; the circles can take on various colors to 
signify the age. A transition allows the movement of a token and is said to have `fired' when this 
happens.  
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Petri nets are a graphical and mathematical modeling tool applicable to many systems. In 
graphical representation, places represent entities such as conditions, buffers, servers, resources 
and queues. Transitions represent concepts in real systems such as algorithms and events. Arcs 
are labeled with their weights (positive integers), where a k-weighted arc can be interpreted as a 
set of k parallel arcs.  
 Labels for unity weights are usually omitted. A marking (state) assigns to each place a 
non-negative integer. If a marking assigns to place p a non-negative integer k, we say that p is 
marked with k tokens. Pictorially, we place k black dots (tokens) in place p. A marking is 
denoted by M, an m-vector, where m is the total number of places. The p
th
 component of M, 
denoted by M (p), is the number of tokens in place p [Murata, 1989]. 
 The behaviour of many systems can be described in terms of system states and their 
changes. In order to simulate the dynamic behaviour of a system, a state or marking in a Petri net 
is changed according to the following transition (firing) rule:  
 A transition t is said to be enabled if each input place p of t is marked with at least w(p,t) 
tokens, where w(p, t) is the weight of the arc from p to t. 
 An enabled transition may or may not fire depending on whether or not the event actually 
takes place. 
 The firing of an enabled transition t removes w(p, t) tokens from each input place p of t, 
and adds w(t, p) tokens to each output place p of t, where w(t, p) is the weight of the arc 
from t to p. 
 n modeling, using the concept of conditions and events, places represent 
conditions, and transitions represent events. A transition (an event) has a certain number 
of input and output places representing the preconditions and post conditions of the event 
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respectively. The presence of a token in a place is interpreted as holding the truth of the 
condition associated with the place. [Murata, 1989]. 
2.2.2 Petri Net Interactions 
The basic interactions are sequential, synchronization, and merging transitions.  The most 
basic model of the Petri net is the state transition from input place p1 to output place p2. Fig. 1 
represents the firing of a token (K) from p1 to p2 based on the transition t1.  
From definition the Petri net can be seen as: 
The Initial state is:  M (0) = [(1, 0)]  
 
Figure 1 Initial State M(0) 
After firing, the state becomes: M (1) = [(0,1)] 
 
 
Figure 2 State M(1) 
 
The concept of sequential is shown in Fig. 3. If there is more than one transition in a path, 
the transition can only fire when its preceding transition has fired. This imposes the precedence 
of constraint t2 after t1. 
 
Figure 3 Sequential Interaction 
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Synchronization is a conditional concept. Previously a transition would fire 
instantaneously if a place had a token, whereas now the transition is dependent on all connected 
places having a token. When the transition fires the tokens, the tokens will merge when more 
than one arrives at the same place. Fig. 4 illustrates synchronization, where transition t1 fires only 
when places p1 and p2 both have a token. Once the condition is met, t1 fires, and the two tokens 
merge. One token is placed in the output place p3, as depicted in Fig. 5. 
 
 
Figure 4 Synchronization Interaction 
 
 
Figure 5 Merged Interaction 
2.2.3 Advantages and Limitations of Petri Nets 
 Using the definition of Petri nets and the concept of sequential, synchronization and 
merging, the ability to model a system conditional can be achieved. 
The advantages of Petri nets are the following [Melnyk, 2003]: 
 Petri nets employ local places. Once the model is constructed, users can change the 
number of tokens or arc weight without modifying the defined conditions. 
 Petri nets can model both software and hardware. 
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 Petri nets model local states instead of global ones. They do not grow out of control as 
the model increases in complexity. 
 Petri nets can be used in various steps of system development and operation, design, 
testing, and simulation. 
 Petri nets allow the user to model dynamic events with distributions other than 
exponential. This gives the user a more accurate representation when simulating real 
world processes.  
 Petri net simulation allows the user to observe tokens as they move throughout the model 
in real or simulated time. This simulation feature gives the user a better understanding of 
the actual process flow and the ability to observe potential conflicts.  
Despite these advantages, there are some limitations of Petri nets, as described in the following 
[Melnyk, 2003]: 
 Petri Net software applications are obscure and difficult to integrate with existing 
software tools. One of the reasons being that developers use different languages for 
software packages causing integration issues. Also, the steep learning curve associated 
with Petri net programming is problematic for new users when modifying or designing 
tools.  
 A lack of readily available software packages. 
 Only discrete events can be modeled with the basic Petri nets. 
2.2.4 Petri Net for Reliability Analysis 
 
System failure analysis based on traditional Petri nets were discussed in [Adamyan & He, 
2004], the proposed methods use transitions to identify the sequences of the events in the Petri 
nets, where the solution is given in terms of the sequences of the firing transition and not the 
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failed state. To compute the probabilities of sequential failures, data from the firing rates of a 
transition were used instead of tokens. The methods employs counters, and the number of times 
transitions are fired to calculate probabilities of sequential failures. This method differs from 
traditional methods of using markings to determine system failure which can’t be applied to 
sequential failure analysis.  
The traditional Petri net is limited to asynchronous systems and it fails to capitalize on 
modeling of real-time systems. A couple of recognized approaches to overcome this limitation 
for reliability analysis are Stochastic Petri net (SPN) and Time Petri Net (TPN). Stochastic Petri 
net is obtained by associating exponentially distributed firing times to the transition. SPN are 
well suited for performance evaluations. 
The Stochastic Petri Net can be defined as a 7-tuple 
SPN = { P, T, I, O, M, m0, Λ } 
Where {P, T, I, O, M, m0} is the marked untimed traditional Petri net and Λ = (λ1, λ2,...,λn)is an 
array of firing rates associated with transitions. A firing delay is associated with each transition. 
It specifies the amount of time that must elapse before the transition can fire [Ajmone, 1989]. 
The other approach to address real-time systems is TPN in which, time is assigned to each 
transition of the original Petri net model replacing instantaneous firing. Another method is to 
place a delay on the place in the traditional Petri net. It has been shown in [Sifakis, 1980] that 
assigning time to a transition or place are equivalent, and can be transformed. An alternative 
method is time Petri net which associates each transition base on an interval {tmin, tmax}, which 
represents the minimum and maximum time during which an enabled transition should fire. 
[Merlin et al, 1976] 
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2.3 Chapter Summary 
This chapter concludes the literature review which has explored the history of, and 
introduced the concept of, PRA. PRA was explored in depth along with the most widely used 
method for modeling and performing PRA, fault trees. The properties and limitations of fault 
trees are discussed and analyzed. Petri nets are introduced as an alternative modeling tool for 
PRA. Petri net concepts, construction methods, and their interactions are discussed and examples 
provided. The advantages and limitations of Petri nets are presented. The following chapter will 
explore Petri nets in depth. Methodologies are introduced on how to use model Petri nets to 
provide a structured approach to perform risk assessment. 
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CHAPTER 3 PETRI NET METHODOLOGY FOR 
PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT MODELING 
STRATEGY 
 
This chapter investigates the methodologies on how to use Petri nets to model system 
failures for PRA. The traditional Petri net has a limited capacity to accurately model system 
failure and therefore perform qualitative and quantitative risk analysis. Gaps between the 
traditional Petri net and requirements for effective system modeling for PRA are bridged. The 
behaviour and interaction principles of the traditional Petri net are explored to create transitional 
logic gates for system failure modeling. A structured approach to Petri net construction is 
introduced to allow a top down methodology for performing qualitative and quantitative analysis. 
Petri net software packages are enhanced to incorporate methods to simulate system failure. PRA 
modeling of systems using Petri net methodology offers distinct advantages over other PRA 
modeling methods.  
3.1 Transformation from Gates to Transitions 
In chapter 2, Petri net interactions were briefly discussed and the concepts of sequential, 
synchronization, and merging transitions were introduced. Building a Petri net model which can 
accurately model complex systems require knowledge of Petri net behaviours involving multiple 
initial states, tokens, arcs and simultaneous transitions. Petri net behaviours are explored in the 
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four cases below and will also act as the building block to develop the transformation from logic 
gates to Petri net transitions.  
 The following four Petri net interactions will aid to further enhance the understanding of 
the basic notions of Petri net construction and behaviours.  
In Fig. 6, the initial marking is M0 = (1, 1, 0), since the tokens are initially in place P1 
and P2, with no token in P3.  Once the condition of T1 is met, the tokens are fired into P3, 
removing a token from P1 and P2. Then a single token representing a change in state is fired into 
P3 with M1 = (0,0,1) as shown in Fig 7.  
 
 
Figure 6  Case 1 Initial State 
 
 
Figure 7 Case 1 State After Firing 
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In Fig. 8, the initial marking is M0 = (2, 1, 0), since the tokens are initially in place P1, 
and P2, with no token in P3. Once the condition of T1 is met, the tokens are fired into T1, 
removing a token from P1 and P2. Then a single token representing a change in state is fired into 
P3, while a token still remains in P1. Therefore the state after firing is M1 = (1,0,1), as shown in 
Fig 9.  
 




Figure 9 Case 2 State After Firing 
 
In Fig. 10 the initial marking is M0 = (1, 1, 0, 0), since the tokens are initially in place P1, 
and P2, with no tokens in P3 or P4. Once the condition of T1 is met, the tokens are fired into T1, 
removing a token from P1 and P2. Then a single token representing a change in state is fired into 




Figure 10 Case 3 Initial State 
 
 
Figure 11 Case 3 State After Firing 
 
In Fig. 12 and Fig. 13, two transition conditions are available T1 and T2. Unlike the 
previous examples, the transition firing condition is not dependent on P1 and P2 having tokens 
simultaneously. Instead, a token in P1 will satisfy the condition to fire tokens from T1 into 




Figure 12 Case 4 Initial State 
 
 
Figure 13 Case 4 State After Firing 
 
Petri nets can also be thought of as a series of Boolean functions, 1 and 0, where 1 
represents a present state and 0 a non-active state. If we continue to think of a Petri net in terms 
of Boolean functions, then for every transition, a truth table can be generated.  
Using the system in Fig. 14, the transition T1 firing is conditional based on places P1 and P2 
both having a token.  The truth table that we can deduce from this Petri net is shown in Table 2. 
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Figure 14 AND Gate 
Table 3 Truth Table of AND Logic 
Input Output 
P1 P2 P3 
0 0 0 
0 1 0 
1 0 0 
1 1 1 
 
This Petri net’s truth table is exactly the same as an AND gate logic. Therefore the Petri 
net from Fig. 14 can be represented as the logic gate AND. Another logic gate OR can also be 
represented by manipulating the Petri net interactions to match their respective properties. Using 
the system in Fig. 15, transition T1 and T2 firing condition’s based on places P1 or P2 containing 
a token. 
 
Figure 15 OR Gate 
 35 
 
Table 4 Truth Table of OR Gate 
Input Output 
P1 P2 P3 
0 0 0 
0 1 1 
1 0 1 
1 1 1 
 
The fact that Petri nets have the ability to be interpreted as a set of Boolean functions 
allow Petri nets to be a viable alternative to event tree and fault tree modeling techniques. Also, 
the use of Petri net logic gates will allow qualitative analysis techniques such as the top down 
approach to be used to obtain minimal cutsets and path sets as seen in later sections. For the 
purposes of this thesis, Petri nets will represent modeling based on system failures and top events. 
Now that a set of Petri net logic gates have been established, one can model systems or 
transform existing systems modeled by fault trees and event trees. The following is to 
demonstrate converting a fault tree into an equivalent Petri net. Figure 16 is a fault tree created 
using the software Relex to model the logic control system of a set of transmitters and then 
converted to its equivalent Petri net model, as shown in Fig. 17 to demonstrate the techniques 
shown previously for AND and OR gate transformations. A series of voting gates represented by 
G1, G2, and G3 are present to indicate when a circuit redundancy has been exceeded, and to 
annunciate or trip a system. Voting gates are widely used in the nuclear systems for logic 
controls. The figures use general basic events B1, B2, B3, B4, and B5 to represent system state 
failures of transmitter communication including low pressure indication, low flow indication, 
and insufficient or excessive level indications. 
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 Working from node G1, we notice that G1 is an AND gate and will become true only 
when basic event B1 and node G4 are true. G4 is a subset of G1 and it is an OR gate which is 
true if any of its inputs B4 or B5 is true. The transformation of gates start from bottom up, 
therefore we can start with G4. 
 Using Fig. 15 as a reference, we notice that basic events B4 and B5 correspond to P1 and 
P2 respectively. The OR gate will be modeled by two basic event places, (B4 & B5), each with 
an arc to their transitions and an arc from the two transitions to place G4.  
 Then we move on to node G1, which is an AND gate. Using Fig. 14, we notice that B1 
and the node G4 (transformed above) are identical to P1 and P2 respectively and therefore can be 
represented by one transition and two places, (B1 & G4), with arcs pointing to the transition and 






Figure 16 Fault Tree: Voting Gate 
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Figure 17 Petri net: Voting Gate 
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3.2 Reachability Analysis versus Top Event Analysis 
Petri net analyses are performed to determine system properties such as: reachability, 
liveliness, safeness, boundedness and stability, conservation, and controllability. The main 
approach for this kind of behavioural analysis is to use the reachability concept. 
Reachability is the most basic problem of a Petri net analysis. A marking is reachable if there 
exists a sequence of transition firing which, starting at the initial marking, results in that marking. 
A net is called live if all transitions in that net are potentially fireable. This is of interest 
to resource allocation system modeling, where avoidance of deadlocks is important. A deadlock 
in a Petri net is defined as a transition or a set of transitions which cannot fire.  
In the Petri net theory, a safe place can have only zero or one token at a time. This 
property is used in fault detection to check if a place has erroneously acquired more than one 
token when it was meant to be a safe place.  
Boundedness examines whether one or more of the system states can grow beyond a limit 
or bound. Stability checks a system’s bounded inputs to determine whether its outputs would 
continue to remain bounded. When the total token count in a set of Petri net places remains 
constant, those places are called conservative. This property is useful in modeling resource 
allocation in a system.  
The controllability of a system is defined as an answer to the question “Is it possible to 
steer a system from a given initial state to an arbitrary state in a finite time period?” [Ogata, 
1987]. A Petri net is said to be completely controllable if any marking is reachable from any 
other marking [Murata, 1989].  
The reachability tree method is based on constructing a complete reachability tree or a 
subset of all reachable states. The reachable states found by this method depend on the initial 
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marking of the net. The reachability tree can help users analyze behaviours of the system or 
structure. The advantage of a reachability tree is that it can be applied to any system, and not 
limited to only sub-class nets [Reisig, 1992][ Lutenbach, 1987]. 
 The construction of a reachability tree begins with the marking M (0) as the root node of 
the tree which discovers other nodes by firing all enabled transitions. Arcs represent the 
transition firings and reveal the nodes which are reachable from the transition. Each new node 
will either be a reachable node or a dead end. The tree is complete when all reachable states are 
discovered.  
The limitations of the reachability tree are that it is only useful for small nets since the 
reachability tree size explodes rapidly with an increase in the state space size. 
3.2.1 Marking Transformation 
The state of a Petri net is represented by marking M. The K
th
 state Mk determines the next 
state Mk+1. [Murata, 1989]. 
Mk+1 = Mk +A
T
S (k = 0, 1, 2,..., n.) (3.1) 
Where, 
Mk is a column vector whose k
th
 component is the marking of place Pk . 
A
T
 is an incidence matrix whose rows are associated with places, and columns are associated 
with transitions.  
S represents a column vector whose i
th
 component denotes the firing time of Ti. 
Combining all marking transformations from an initial marking Mo to a final marking Mn, Eqn. 
3.1 can be rewritten as: 
Mn = Mo + A
T





 ∑ = ΔM = Mn -–Mo (3.3) 
Where ∑ denotes a firing-count vector, i.e. assume a firing sequence of T2, T3 and T3 then the 
resulting firing-count vector ∑1 = [01101].  
 Using the marking transformation and reachability concept, Petri net analyses can be 
used to determine system failure and the events leading up to the system failure. Whenever a 
token enters the top place, it indicates a system failure. Therefore, by setting the last component 
marking column vector to be the top place, Mn = [**,,,*1]
T
, where n denotes the n
th
 modification 
and * represents the number of tokens in the n
th
 place, the events leading up to the system failure 
can be determined. 
3.2.2 Renumbering Matrix Method for Static Analysis 
The marking transformation may be prone to human error when analyzing a large system 
complex system, therefore the renumber matrix method was developed to ease the difficulty of 
keeping track of places and transitions as the number of places and transitions were not always 
equal. The renumber matrix method addresses the issue by reorganizing the incidence matrix to a 
triangle matrix. The resultant matrix simplifies the transformation analysis and becomes user 
friendly. The method used to modify the existing Petri net is as follows: 
1. Assign numbers to basic places. 
2. The numbers of places and transitions are the same. If there are multiple input places 
connected to a common transition, the number of each transition has as many characters 
as the number of input places. 
3. Number other output places and transitions. 
4. Put the numbers in entries of an incidence matrix. 
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5. Append a column with its last entry as -1 to the right of the matrix. A square matrix is 
thus formed. 
To demonstrate this renumbering method, the Petri net, which represents a 2-out-of-3 
voting logic as shown in Fig. 18, will be modified. Its associated triangular matrix is presented in 
Table 4. 2-out-of-3 voting logic gates are found in various redundant systems within a nuclear 
power plant including Shutdown System 1 (SDS1), annunciations, and Instrument and Control 
(I&C) logics to name a few. After applying the renumbering algorithm, the modified Petri net, 
Fig. 19, is obtained. Notice that the Petri net system remains unchanged and all logic gates are 
still identical to Fig. 18. This was simply a nomenclature modification, where the number of 
terms for each transition matches the places.  
In the following reachability model, it can be said that if the initial state M0 can reach place P18 





All arc weights for this system are 1. T2 is enabled and can fire since P2 has a token.  




The transition gates T9_T10, which represents an AND gate, is enabled when both places P9 and 
P10 contain a token. When the AND gate transition is enabled, both tokens in P9 and P10 are 
removed and then fired into P15.  




Finally, transition T15 is enabled and can fire which leads to the top event P18 becoming active 






Using the static analysis method, the reachability concept, it has been determined that 
with an initial marking of M0, the top event P18 can be reached within M3. The renumbering 
method of Petri net construction has simplified the configuration for places and transitions to 
perform analysis for static analysis. This method also allows users to build an n x n matrix to 
trace and track Petri net systems for system failure modeling analysis.   
 
 






Figure 19 Renumbered Petri net of Figure 18
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 =   
 
 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 T8 T9 T10 T11 T12 T13 T14 T15 T16 T17 T18 
P1 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
P2 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
P3 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
P4 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
P5 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
P6 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
P7 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
P8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
P9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
P10 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
P11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
P12 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
P13 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 
P14 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 
P15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 
P16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 -1 0 0 
P17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 -1 0 




3.3 Minimal Cutset Analysis Using Petri Net 
Qualitative analyses are used to identify possible ways in which a system can fail and to 
identify proper precautions (design changes, administrative procedures, etc) that will reduce the 
frequency or consequences of such failures [IEEE Std. 352-1987]. A qualitative reliability 
analysis can be performed with one or more of the following objectives: 
1. To identify weak spots or imbalances in the design. 
2. To aid in the systematic assessment of overall plant safety. 
3. To document and assess the relative importance of all identified failures. 
4. To provide a systematic compilation of data as a preliminary step to facilitate 
quantitative analyses. 
One of the most important results from qualitative analyses is the minimal cutset. 
Minimal cutsets describe the combination of events or component failures that cause the top 
event to occur i.e. system failure. From Section 3.1, it was determined that Petri nets could 
represent a set of Boolean functions. Therefore, it could model system failures for PRA similar 
to fault trees. When system failure is modeled as a set of Petri net logic gates, the top-down 
methodology, which is used to solve for MCS, becomes an easy and viable method for 
qualitative analysis. The method is described as follows [Murata, 1989]: 
1. Write down the numbers of places by making a horizontal arrangement if the output place 
is connected by multi-arcs to transitions. 
2. Write down the number of places by making a vertical arrangement if the output place is 
connected by an arc to a common transition. 
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3. When all places are replaced by basic places, a matrix is established. If there is a common 
entry located between rows or columns, it is the entry shared for each row or column. The 
column vectors of the matrix represent cutsets while row vectors represent path sets. 
4. Remove the supersets to obtain the minimal cutsets and minimal path sets.  
To demonstrate the top-down methodology, Fig. 17 is used. Table 5 represents the four 
steps to determine the minimal cutsets.  
Step 1: The horizontal arrangement represents the events to the top event, which are G1, G2, and 
G3.  
Step 2: Each event can be reduced to a set of places, events, or a combination of places and 
events. In the case of event G1, it can be reduced to place B1 and event G4, where G1 is true 
when the AND logic between B1 and G4 is true. G4 can be further reduced to the place B4 and 
B5 where G4 is true when the OR logic of B4 or B5 is true. The same steps are applied for G2 
and G3.  
Step 3 is represented by Table 5. 
Step 4: Identify the minimum cuts set(s). 
Table 6 Minimal Cutset for Figure 17 
Step 1 G1 G2 G3 
Step 2 B1 
G4 


















Step 4 [B1, B4], [B1, B5], [B2, B3, B4]. [B2, B3 B5], [B1, B2 B3] 
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Therefore the results for qualitative analysis for minimal cutsets using the top down 
methodology are as follows: [B1, B4], [B1, B5], [B2, B3, B4]. [B2, B3, B5],  and [B1, B2, B3]. 
The minimal path sets can be obtained with a similar method to the minimal cutsets. Step 1 
continues the events that lead to the top event in a horizontal arrangement, are seen in Fig. 17, 
G1, G2 and G3. Identical to Step 2 from the MCS analysis, the events can be reduced to a set of 
places or combination of places and events. As seen in Table 6, G1 is reduced to place B1 and 
event G4 and further reduction of G4 becomes events B4B5. The same method can be applied to 
G2 and G3 to obtain their places. Step 3 in Table 6 represents the places of each event and the 
expanded Step 3 below represents all possible combinations of places. For example, the first 
entry B1 B4 B5 B1 is obtained by the places B1, B4B5 from G2 and B1 from G3 event. The 
second entry B1B4B5B3 is obtained by the place B1, B4B5 and B3 from event G7 and the third 
entry is obtained by the places B1, B4B5 and B2 from event G7. The same step is applied to all 
the other places, and will be expanded to represent an exhausted list of combinations for events 
G1, G2 and G3. Once all path sets are obtained, the minimum path set can be selected which are: 
[B1, B3], [B1, B2], [B1, B4, B5], [B3, B4, B5], [B2, B4, B5]. The traditional methods for 
qualitative analysis do present a challenge to human error due to volume but, there are 
mechanisms in place such as the renumbering matrix to reduce the likelihood of error. 
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Table 7 Minimum Path Set for Figure 17 
Step 1 G1 G2 G3 
Step 2 B1 
G4 
G5 G6 B1 
G7 
Step 3 B1 B4B5 B1 
B4B5 B3 B3 
 B2 B2 
Step 4 [B1, B3], [B1, B2], [B1, B4, B5], [B3, B4, B5], [B4, B5, B2]. 
 
 
3.4 Non-coherent System Analysis 
Non-coherent events are encountered in nuclear safety systems due to the regulatory 
requirement that not all redundant loops should be simultaneously disabled due to maintenance. 
In a non-coherent system, both components’ failed and non-failed states are events for system 
failure analysis. Non-coherent systems are represented in a fault tree by a NOT gate, or exclusive 
OR (XOR) gate. The use of the NOT gate increases the complexity of analysis.  
 Once the NOT gate is used, cutsets do not apply any more since the fault tree no longer 
has monotone properties (the definition of non-coherent fault trees can be found in Appendix D). 
Therefore the minimum cutset concept should be replaced by a set of literals in a prime implicant 
in Boolean algebra. A complete set of prime implicant sets gives all modes of system failure so 
that qualitative and quantitative system analysis can be completed. However, this is rarely done 
in practice due to time consuming calculations. In nuclear systems, separate PRA models are 
developed and analyzed for each redundant loop. Each event is then subsequently used as an 
input in an OR gate for analysis.  
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 Non-coherent systems can be modeled with Petri nets as well with the introduction of the 
inhibitor arc, as shown in Fig. 20 below. The inhibitor arc is shown as a line with a hollowed out 
circle at the edge. This edge is equivalent as a NOT gate at the end of an arc. 
 
Figure 20 Inhibitor Arc 
 
 Consider the non-coherent fault tree in Fig. 21, whose top event is represented as an 
AND combination of n monotonic sub-trees.  
 
 
Figure 21 Non-Coherent System 
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 According to the definition of monotonic fault trees, the derivation of minimal cutsets is 
equivalent to that for coherent fault trees. Failure 1 from Fig. 21 can be solved with the 
traditional top-down algorithm, and Failure 2 from Fig. 21, can be obtained as follows: 
Let Υ denote the binary indicator variable for system failure in Fig. 21. Prime implicant 
can be obtained as follows: 
Υ = (X1 + X2) * (X1’ + X3’) 
= (X1 * X1’) + (X1 * X3’) + (X2 * X1’) + (X2 * X3’) 
= (X1 * X3’) + (X2 * X1’) + (X2 * X3’) 
Where xn’ refers to the nonexistence of event xn. 
Therefore, prime implicants can be obtained as {X1, X3’}, {X2, X1’}, and {X2, X3’}. 
 
3.5 Quantitative Risk Analysis 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment can be split into two stages: qualitative analysis and 
quantitative analysis. In a quantitative analysis, users represent the system by a mathematical 
model, assign probabilities to each failure mode of concern, and reconcile the calculated 
estimates of system unavailability and unreliability with the overall system goals. 
System availability (As(t)) is the  probability that the top event does not exist at time t. 
This is the probability of the system operating successfully. On the other hand, System 
unavailability (Qs(t)) is the probability that the top event exists at time t. This is either the 
probability of system failure or the probability of a particular system hazard at time t. It can be 
seen that the system unavailability is complementary to the availability, and the following 
identity holds: 
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As(t) + Qs(t) = 1 (3.4) 
Other variables relating to quantitative analysis include system reliability, unreliability, 
failure density, conditional failure intensity, unconditional failure intensity, and mean time to 
failure. For the purposes of this thesis, the focus will be system unavailability.  
The assumption regarding basic events P1, ..., Pn is that they are independent, which 
means that the occurrence of a given basic event is not affected by the occurrence of any other 
basic event. Therefore, 
Pr{P1∩P2∩...∩Pn} = Pr{P1}Pr{P2}...Pr{Pn} (3.5) 
Where the symbol ∩ represents the intersection of events 
Consider an AND gate where simultaneous existence of basic events result in the top 
event. The system unavailability Qs(t) is given by the probability that all basic events exist at 
time t: 
Qs(t) = Pr{P1∩P2∩...∩Pn} = Pr{P1}Pr{P2}…Pr{Pn} (3.6) 
Consider an OR gate where the top event exists at time t if, and only if, at least one of the 
n basic events exists at time t. The system unavailability Qs(t) is given by: 
Qs(t) = Pr{P1 U P2 U... U Pn} (3.7) 
Where the symbol U denotes a union of the events 
From Eqn. (3.4),  






It is possible to describe the state of the basic event or the system by a binary indicator 
variable. If we assign a binary indicator variable Υi to the basic event i, then: 
Υi = 1, when the basic event i exists 
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Υi = 0, when the basic event i does not exist 
Top event is associated with a binary indicator variable Ψ (Υ) related to the state of the 
system by: 
Ψ(Υ) = 1, when the top event exists 
Ψ(Υ) = 0, when the top event does not exist. 
3.6 RELEX Software Application 
For PRA, it is quite inefficient to have users model and calculate qualitative and 
quantitative analysis by hand. The modeling alone would be too time intensive, and the 
likelihood of human error is great. Therefore, using computer software to model and perform 
calculations is often used even for the most rudimentary tasks because they allow users to make 
instant modifications. 
In general, a PRA software tool should be able to accomplish the defined PRA tasks. 
Some tasks in particular identify initiating events, model scenarios using fault tree or event 
sequence diagrams, accommodate multiple mission stages, model failure mechanism using fault 
trees, quantify the scenarios and fault trees using Boolean reduction, perform uncertainty, 
sensitivity and ranking analysis, and provide the correct results.  
Relex provides a set of reliability analysis tools including Reliability Prediction, 
Reliability Block Diagram (RBD), high level Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA or 
FMECA), Fault Tree, Failure Reporting, Analysis, and Corrective Action System (FRACAS), 
Event Tree, and more. In this thesis, Relex Studio fault tree components are used. The software 
program chosen to meet the demands of such assessment is Relex [Relex, 2007-2012]. 
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3.7 Petri Net Software Application 
The Petri nets’ most visible advantage over traditional PRA modeling techniques such as 
fault tree analyses, is the ability to be used as a graphical tool to simulate system and process, 
providing users with a more hands-on approach to modify and analyze system behaviour. For the 
purpose of this thesis, the Petri net software used is Snoopy [Rohr et al, 2010]. Snoopy has the 
ability to model and simulate system modeling for traditional Petri nets, extended Petri nets, and 
extended stochastic Petri nets. The simulation feature allows user to start, pause, and modify 
places and tokens during mid process. Snoopy has the following distinguished features: 
1. It is extensive. Its generic design facilitates the implementation of new graph types. 
2. It is adaptive by supporting the simultaneous use of several graph types, while the GUI 
adapts dynamically to the graph type in the active window. 
For the purposes of PRA, the objective is to determine system failure, the occurrence of 
top events. Petri net simulation currently involves manually inputting tokens into places (initial 
marking), and examining their behaviour in a system. In the case of system failure analysis, this 
is the reachability concept. However, there are two major limitations of Petri net simulation for 
PRA:  
 The first limitation is that Petri net simulation does not recognize that each Petri net place 
(event), for the purposes of PRA system modeling, should represent a Boolean state. The state 
should indicate to the user whether it has failed or not. This limitation exists because of the 
definition of Petri nets Eqn. (2.1) where the weighted function M (k) = [m1(k), m2(k), … mI(k)]
T
 
refers to the number of tokens in each place.  
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The second limitation with Petri net software is the ability to simulate a system failure 
without any user initial markings. Initiating events which do not require user initial markings 
input ensure a more random simulation.  
Snoopy is not open source and therefore does not provide source code to be modified to 
overcome the limitations for PRA modeling purposes. Therefore a new software package is 
developed, introduced, and explained in detail to overcome the limitations of modeling for PRA 
within the Snoopy software. The software package will consist of Java classes for places, arcs, 
and transitions for a traditional Petri net. It should be noted that the software package is not 
meant as a stand-alone program to model and simulate Petri net but rather an interpretation of the 
Snoopy source code with enhancements to overcome the two limitations of a failed state and 
random initial markings. 
 
3.7.1 Petri Net Failed State Simulation  
When the Petri net definition is modified such that a place can consist of a Boolean state, 
this will translate into a more accurate modeling technique for the purposes of PRA where the 
main concern is the probability of the top event occurrence. The place marking will still accept 
tokens, and transitions will continue to be enabled based on conditions set out by the arc weight. 
Once the conditions of the transition are enabled, the place will then be in a failed state and will 
not be able to accept further tokens. This thesis does not explore system behaviour when repairs 
are introduced; therefore once a place’s state is failed, it will remain failed until a new simulation 
has begun.  
The main software classes required to develop a traditional Petri net are place, transition, 
and arc classes. A place may have an integer or Boolean initial marking, an integer weight, input 
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transitions, and output transitions. The transitions must have valid transition identifiers at the 
point of creation. During place creation, users must provide names to place(s) with a given Petri 
net system and define their attributes. The following properties belong to the place class: 
PlaceCreation ‘place’ Place 
‘place’ Place PlaceDefinition 
Place Identifier PlaceParams 
PlaceParams (InitialMarking) 
(UpperBound) 










PlaceProperty PlaceInputs or, 
PlaceOutputs 
PlaceInputs ‘in’ ‘:’ TransitionList 
PlaceOutputs ‘out’ ‘:’ TransitionList 
TransitionList TransitionArc 
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Transition creation function provides names to transitions in the Petri net and defines 
their attribute. Transitions may consist of input places, output places, and conditions for firing. 
Input and output place names must be valid identifiers at the point of the creation of the 
transition. The conditions of firing are given the attribute name ‘fire’. The values of this attribute 
are immediate, or FireCondition. Immediate attribute indicates the immediate firing of a token 
once the conditions of a transition are true. The immediate attribute is currently the only attribute 
available for traditional Petri net simulation using the Snoopy software. The FireCondition is a 
public method. When called, it will block the firing until the transition condition(s) are enabled, 
before firing the transition. The following properties belong to the Transition class: 
TransitionCreation ‘transition’ Transition 
Transition Identifier 
TransitionDefine TransitionAttribute + FireCondition 






Transition Inputs ‘in’ ‘:’ PlaceList 
 58 
TransitionOutputs ‘out’ ‘:’ PlaceList 




PlaceArc PlaceName + ArcWeight 
PlaceName Identifier 
 
Now that the classes for place and transition are defined within a Java environment, Petri 
net coding can be used to define Petri net systems.  
 
Figure 22 A Simple Petri Net 
 
Figure 22 represents a simple Petri net. There are two places, p1 and p2, and one 
transition, t1. The initial marking is one token in p1. t1 has one input arc from p1 and one output 
arc to p2. t1 is currently enabled because t1’s input place (p1) has a token, and is ready to fire. 
The arc weight of Fig. 22 has a default value of 1. The transition t1 will fire because all the 
conditions for firing have been met: a token available in the transitions input place and the token 
is equal to or greater than the weight of the arc connecting it. To represent this Petri net in Java 





place p1(=1), p2; 





In the code above, SimplePetriNet defines the two places (p1 and p2), and a transition 
(t1), as seen in Fig. 22. Input (in) for place (p1), where p1(=1) indicates that p1 has an initial 
marking of one token. Once the program runs, SimplePetriNet will look at the conditions of t1 
and notice that it is enabled and fire it. This will cause the token in p1 to be removed and place a 
token into p2 as shown in Fig. 23.  
 
Figure 23 A Simple Petri Net Transition 
The Petri net model in Fig. 22 is an example of the immediate firing condition. 
Sometimes, the user will want to control the time when a transition fires when all conditions are 
met and the transition is enabled. In this case, a slight modification to the code is required; the 





transition t1 { 
in: p1; 
out:  p2; 
fire: fireCondition 
} 
In this case, transition t1 will not fire until it is requested to do so by the user.  
The limitation of the current Petri net software is the inability to simulate a modeled 
system for the purpose of PRA, because the current Petri net simulation structure cannot properly 
represent a failed state once the subsequent transition fires. In Fig. 22, the current place p1 has a 
token, which represents a failed state. But once the transition t1 fires, the token is removed from 
p1 and marked in place p2. It may be obvious in this scenario that in order for p2 to receive a 
token, place p1 must have received a token first and therefore be in a failed state. However, in 
the case of Fig. 24, it becomes less obvious when place p3 is in a failed state which means failure 
p1 or p2 caused the transition to enable and fire. To address this issue, the place method will 
include a Boolean indication for failed state once a transition is enabled, and will not accept 
another token as a failed state cannot further fail.  
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Figure 24 Petri Net Transition to a Failed State 
The place, arc and transition classes were developed to represent the modified structure 







public class Place { 
  protected int tokens ;  
  protected int bound ; 
  protected Boolean bound_state; 
  protected String name ; 
    protected Point coord; 
 
  public Place() { 
    this(0) ; 
  } 
     
  public Place(int t, int b, b odelinc) { 
    tokens = t ; 
    bound = b ; 
    bound_state = c; 
    coord = new Point(); 





class Arc { 
  public Place place ; 
  public int weight ; 
  public int bound ; 
 
  public Arc(Place p) { 
    this(p,1) ; 
  } 
 
  public Arc(Place p, int w) { 
    place = p ; 
    weight = w ; 
    bound = p.bound ; 









public abstract class Transition { 
  protected HashSet in, out ; 
  protected Boolean immediate ; 
  protected String name ; 
    protected Point coord; 
 
    public abstract void onFire() ; 
 
  public void addIn(Place p) { 
    addIn(p,1) ; 
  } 
 
  public void addIn(Place p, int weight) { 
    synchronized(in) { 
      in.add(new Arc(p,weight)) ; 
    } 
  } 
 
  public void addOut(Place p) { 
    addOut(p,1) ; 
  } 
 
  public void addOut(Place p, int weight) { 
    synchronized(out) { 
      out.add(new Arc(p,weight)) ; 
    } 
  } 
   
  public void setImmediate(boolean imm) { 
    immediate = imm ; 
  } 
} 
 
The place class has been coded to include another parameter for its place called 
bound_state, which is a Boolean variable to indicate whether or not a transition has been enabled 
based on that state. If the place occupied a token and enabled a transition, this indicates a failed 
state and therefore the bound_state would result in a true. In Fig. 25, place p1, which contained a 
token that enabled transition t1 to fire, was marked as true for the bound_state, therefore a visual 




Figure 25 Petri Net Failed State with Failed States 
Petri net users can also use arc weights to distinguish between various events when 
setting up their model using the simulator. Arc weights default at 1, which is represented by a 
black dot or token. Using Petri net simulations, users can modify the arc weight of transitions as 
a visual indicator of failure rates or probability of failure. Visually, this can be achieved by 
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increasing the arc weight for basic events with lower rates of failure and use the default for basic 









 range, this can be represented in 
the simulator by a higher arc weight for the lower failure rate. Increasing arc weight from the 
default value offers many advantages for the simulator’s GUI as this provides a visual indication 
which distinguishes basic events, which are more prone to failure, to ones with a longer life span 
which do not require the same surveillance. 
3.7.2 Petri Net Simulation 
The second limitation this thesis will address in traditional Petri net software is the 
absence of the feature to generate initial markings without user input. This feature is beneficial 
for simulation purposes as it creates a sense of randomness and may produce scenarios the user 
had not predicted. This feature will assist with the reachability concept simulation to determine if 
an initial marking M0 will produce a system failure at Mk, where k is the top event.  
Traditionally, the transition function is written to require an in and out place and an 
associated arc weight as requisites to enable the transition. Once the in place consists of enough 
tokens to meet the requirements of the arc weight, the transition enables and fires the token to the 
out place. This thesis introduces a new type of transition function which requires no in place or 
arc weight requisite to become enabled. This initial transition function can have an immediate 
fire time or be user conditioned to fire; therefore these transitions will be enabled at time 0 and 
will create the initial markings M0.  
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Figure 26 Traditional Petri Net 
 
Figure 26 represents a typical Petri net model for system failure with the top event at the 
top represented as a place with basic events at the bottom: P1, P2 and P3. Transitions T1 and T2 
represent the logic gates AND and OR respectively. There are no initial markings in Fig. 26, thus 
when we use the simulation function, nothing will happen because there are no tokens in places 
P1, P2, or P3, therefore the transition cannot meet the requirements to become enabled and has 
nothing to fire.  
The original transition class has been modified to allow transitions to enable without an 
in place by setting the weight arc to be zero. This way the transitions are constantly enabled and 
ready to fire.  
import java.util.HashSet ; 
import java.awt.Point; 
 
public abstract class initialTransition { 
  protected HashSet  out ; 
  protected Boolean immediate ; 
  protected String name ; 
 
  public initialTransition () { 
    immediate = true ; 
    out = new HashSet() ; 
  } 
 67 
 
    public abstract void onFire() ; 
 
  public void addIn(Place p) { 
    addIn(p,0) ; 
  } 
 
  public void addIn(Place p, int weight) { 
    synchronized(in) { 
      in.add(new Arc(p,0)) ; 
    } 
  } 
 
  public void addOut(Place p) { 
    addOut(p,1) ; 
  } 
 
  public void addOut(Place p, int weight) { 
    synchronized(out) { 
      out.add(new Arc(p,weight)) ; 
    } 
  } 
   
  public void setImmediate(boolean imm) { 
    immediate = imm ; 
  } 
 
  public void setName(String name) { 
    this.name = name ; 
  } 
 
  public String getName() { 
    return name; 
  } 
} 
 
If the input to the transition is null, the transition will be true and enable. This represents 
a case where the user is trying to simulate a system with no initial markings and the transitions 
fire without user control.  
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Figure 27 Modified Petri Net 
 
The user would set up Fig. 27 such that the transitions T_Prior have no inbound places 
and only an out bound place with a default weighted arc so that they are enabled at time t0. The 
initial transitions are linked to the basic event places P1, P2 and P3, while the transitions T1 and 
T2 are linked to their input places, and outbound to the top event place. The code to model the 




public class PetriTest extends PetriNet { 
    public static void main(String[] args) { 
 PetriTest test = new PetriTest(); 
 
 Place p1 = new Place(0); 
 p1.setName("P1"); 
 
 Place p2 = new Place(0); 
 p2.setName("P2"); 
 
 Place p3 = new Place(0); 
 p3.setName("P3"); 
 









 Transition t_prior_1 = new initialTransition(); 
 t1.setName("T_Prior_1") ; 
 t1.addOut(P1, 1) ; 
 
 Transition t_prior_2 = new initialTransition(); 
 t1.setName("T_Prior_2"” ; 
 t1.addOut(P2, 1) ;; 
 
 Transition t_prior_3 = new initialTransition(); 
 t1.setName("T_Prior_3") ; 
 t1.addOut(P3, 1) ; 
 
 Transition t1 = new initialTransition(); 
 t1.setName("T1") ; 
 t1.addOut(P4, 1) ; 
 
 Transition t2 = new initialTransition(); 
 t2.setName("T2") ; 












Figure 28 Simulation Markings 
 
In Fig. 27, if the user incorporates initial transitions before the basic events places P1, P2 
or P3, and simulate the model, the simulator will populate the basic event places as seen in Fig. 
28. This allows the Petri net to be simulated without any user initial markings. The simulation 
will then proceed the same way as if the user had inputted the initial markings and stop once the 
top event is populated.  
Figure 29 illustrates the issue with simulator generated markings. The existing software 
package is built based on the original Petri net definition and does not recognize, for the 
purposes of PRA, that the events will represent the failure of equipment or failed states. There 
are instances where markings will be fired into already failed states as seen in Fig. 29. This 
presents a case where a state has already failed, but the traditional Petri net software structure 
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does not recognize the system failure model and continues to enable transitions which do not 
accurately reflect the system’s behaviour.  
 
 
Figure 29 Double Markings 
This limitation can be addressed by combining the modified place class from the previous 
sub section and incorporate the bound_state as an indication of a failed state. If the output to the 
transition is bound_state true, the transitions will hold off on the firing even if the fire conditions 
are all true and enabled. 
3.8 Chapter Summary 
This chapter provides an in-depth assessment of traditional Petri nets and identifies the 
gaps preventing it from becoming a modeling technique for system failures within PRA. 
Techniques are developed to revise and tailor traditional Petri net modeling for system failure 
analysis applications. Methodologies for Petri net constructions for PRA are established to 
provide a structured approach to perform qualitative and quantitative analysis. Petri net 
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construction techniques such as building logic gates and transforming existing fault trees to Petri 
nets are explored. Petri net methods for obtaining initiating events are discussed. Qualitative 
analysis for obtaining minimal cut and path sets are demonstrated through examples. The 
fundamentals of quantitative analysis for system unavailability are discussed. Non-coherent 
systems are introduced, modeling them with Petri nets were shown, and methods for obtaining 
prime implicants were explored. Lastly, a Petri net simulation software package is developed in 
expanded detail to overcome the limitations of traditional software programs: such as the 
absence of non-user generated initial markings, and the inability to model a failed state. The 
ability to model a failed state is an important characteristic for system failure modeling for PRA. 
The software classes developed tailored the traditional Petri net software to accurately model and 
simulate system failures for PRA. The following chapter demonstrates the Petri net as a 
modeling tool for PRA by exploring its application in an airlock system of a containment 
boundary, and a Maintenance Cooling System for a design basis accident. These case studies will 
demonstrate Petri net’s ability to model system failure and provide a structured approach for 
qualitative and quantitative analysis. 
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CHAPTER 4 APPLICATION OF PETRI NETS IN A 
CANDU REACTOR 
This chapter demonstrates the applications of Petri net for PRA by exploring the airlock 
system and the maintenance cooling system in a CANDU nuclear power plant. The first case 
study describes the airlock systems, its operation and equipment used across the plant as per the 
Defense-in-Depth methodology. A Petri net is used to model system failure and analysis is 
performed to determine minimal cutsets and system unavailability. The second case study 
explores the operational side of a CANDU nuclear power plant by studying the maintenance 
cooling system design function and effects of key equipment failure such as their pumps and 
isolations valves. The Petri net is constructed as a non-coherent system and the prime implicants 
are obtained. Both cases establish the importance of design and its effect on future probabilistic 
analysis. 
4.1 CANDU Airlock System for Containment Boundary 
 The top objective for any nuclear power plant is to safely produce power. During any 
design basis accident, a nuclear power plant must prevent or limit the release of radioactive 
material to the public and environment. In a CANDU reactor, the reactor is enclosed by a 
containment building built from concrete. The only access to and from the containment 
building are the airlock doors located on various levels of the building.  
 An airlock is a chamber in the containment wall of the reactor vault with two doors. One 
door opens to the inside of the reactor vault, and the other door to the outside of the reactor vault. 
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The airlock, which is considered part of the Negative Pressure Containment (NPC) system, is 
required to perform the safety function of maintaining the containment boundary. At least one 
airlock door must be closed with sufficient pressure maintained in the seal to ensure preservation 
of the containment boundary. This implies that both sets of seals on each door are qualified. 
Airlock door seals may be deflated only when the door is in use. All airlocks and transfer 
chambers have valves to equalize the pressure across the service and containment doors before 
the doors are operated.  
 Following all DBA conditions, including all LOCAs (Large, Small, In-Core), Flooding 
Events (FE) (other than LOCA or Feedwater), Fuel Handling System Failures (FHSF), LOCA+ 
Loss of Emergency Coolant Injection (LOECI) and Secondary Side Line Break (SSLB) events, 
the credited safety function of the airlock door seal is to remain inflated with sufficient seal 
pressure to ensure a containment boundary. Electromechanical indicators on the containment 
panel in the control room are operated by pressure switches monitoring the pressure in the air 
seals and by limit switches monitoring the state of the doors. The components associated with the 
door seals must maintain a pressure boundary and not leak externally for up to three months.  
 Maintaining pressure boundary is crucial to remaining compliant with the safety 
objectives in place for nuclear power plants. A potential leak or equipment failure at this point 





4.2 Case Study I: Airlock Safety System during a Design Basis Accident 
In this case, the scenario involves a DBA occurrence and the instrument air system is 
now offline. The airlock seals, which have a credited safety function to maintain pressure 
boundary for up to three months, are switched to back up air supply tanks. For a simplified 
airlock system, the top event is failure to maintain pressure boundary. The causes for this failure 
are failure of the equalizer valve, door fails to close or hatch is not locked, and the inflatable 
seals fail to perform their credited safety feature.  
Equalizer valves are designed to equalize the pressure between the reactor bay and 
service side. They function by opening vents in the equalizer valve to allow airflow to enter the 
airlock chamber until pressure is equalized, and then the vents in the equalizer valve will close. 
The equalizer valve vent area is designed to limit the ingress of air into the containment to 
minimize the emergency filtered air discharge system capacity. A set of pipes lead to the service 
side, and another set to the reactor bay. The equalizer valves fail when the gear box fails, which 
prevent the vents from opening or closing to allow constant flow between the reactor bay and 
service side. The equalizer valves’ safety function cannot be met when the exhaust pipe cannot 
close or seal properly. 
To meet the safety function for maintaining pressure boundary, the airlock doors must be 
closed by a latch or else a beacon light and annunciation to the MCR will occur. If the door is not 
properly closed and latched, the equalizer valves and seals would not be available to provide 
their safety functions either. The instrumentation provided for airlocks are required to control 
pneumatically operated doors, and provide indication of low air pressure in inflatable door seals 
and indication of the state of doors (open/closed).  
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In the event of a DBA, the airlock door seals are designed to inflate thus creating the 
necessary seal to maintain pressure boundary. During normal operation, the door seals are 
inflated via the instrument air system. During a DBA however, the inflation of the seals are 
switched to the back-up air supply tank. This presents a potential for system failure because of 
the limited air supply compared to during normal operation when a constant supply came from 
the instrument air system.  
 FMEA is a design tool used in reliability assessment and is recognized as an essential 
function in design. It is defined as “a systematic process for identifying potential design and 
process failures before they occur, with the intent to eliminate them or minimize the risk 
associated with them” [IMCA, 2002]. The purposes of an FMEA are as follows [IEEE Std.352, 
1987]: 
1. To assist in selecting design alternatives with high reliability and high safety potential 
during early design phases. 
2. To ensure that all conceivable failure modes and their effects on the operational success 
of the system have been considered. 
3. To list potential failures and identify the magnitude of their effects. 
4. To develop early criteria for test planning and the design of test and checkout systems. 
5. To provide a basis for quantitative reliability and availability analyses. 
6. To assist in the objective evaluation of design requirements related to redundancy, failure 
detection systems, fail-safe characteristics, and automatic and manual override. 
 Table 7 demonstrates the FMEA for the airlock system and describes the function 
for each component, modes of failure which affect the top event, mechanisms which can 
fail, and their overall effect on the system. Based on the behaviour properties of the 
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equipment identified in Table 7, their associated failure rates were identified using data 
from IEEE and IAEA as seen in Table 8. The data obtained in Table 8 will be used for 
quantitative analysis of the overall airlock system to determine the failure probability of 
the top event – failure to maintain pressure boundary. 
 
Table 8 FMEA of the Airlock System 
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis – Airlock System 
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Table 9 Airlock Equipment Failure Rates 













E1 – Exhaust 
pipe  
 




D1 – Door  
 






RATE 1.34E-06 0.42E-06 [IEEE Std. 352, 
1987] 
V1 – Valve  RATE 1.62E-06 0.89E-06 [IEEE Std. 352, 
1987] 
P1 –Piping 
system (small)  
RATE  2.4E-06 [IAEA-TECDOC-
930, 1997] 
P2 –Piping 
system (Big)  
 
RATE  1.4E-06 [IAEA-TECDOC-
930, 1997] 
T1 – Tank  
 
RATE  1.21E-06 [IEEE Std. 352, 
1987] 
T2 – Back up 
tank fails to 
engage 
 










Figure 31 Airlocks System Petri Net 
 81 
The contributing factors to airlock system failures include: 
 Seals deflating during the course of the accredited safety function 
 Back up tank being empty 
 Cracks in the seal leading to loss of air 
 Pipe leak leading to loss of air (causing deflation) 
 Valve failure, including check valves, allowing back flow or relief valves to release 
prematurely 
 Seals do not inflate after a Design Basis Accident 
 Back up tanks do not engage 
 Major pipe leak (preventing inflation) 
 Valve failure, including check valves, not allowing positive flow and relief valves to 
constantly vent 
 
Figure 30 and 31 models the airlock system in fault tree and Petri net format respectively. 
The fault tree model is used to verify the qualitative analysis of the Petri net model. The 
variables represent the following failure events: 
 G1 – Gearbox fails 
 E1 – Exhaust pipe does not close or seat 
 D1 – Door fails to close or lock 
 S1 – Crack(s) in seal 
 V1 – Valve failure; check valve preventing flow or allowing back flow, relief valve 
prematurely releasing or not closing, any valve that operates outside of the design 
function causing leaks 
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 P1 – Small Pipe leaks in the piping system (piping small, <= 2.5cm diameter, 169 welds) 
 P2 – Medium pipe leaks in the piping system (piping medium, 1”< diameter) 
 T1 – Back up tank is empty 
 T2 – Back up tank fails to engage 
 
Table 10 Minimum Cutset For Airlock System Based On The Petri Net Model 
Minimum Cutset for Figure 31 
Step 1 X1 Replace X1 





















Table 11 Minimum Cutset For Airlock System Based On The Petri Net Model (Cont’d) 

















The qualitative analysis is performed first based on the Petri net model. The details are shown in 
Table 9. A simplified airlock system was modeled for system failure, and based on the number of 
basic events only two orders of cutsets were generated.   
The minimum cutsets produced by the Petri net model are: 
1
st
 Order: [D1], [P2], [T2], and [V1] 
2
nd
 Order: [G1, E1], [T1, P1], and [T1, S1] 
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To verify the qualitative analysis of the Petri net model, a fault tree model is constructed 
using Relex, and minimal cutsets are obtained as shown in Fig. 32. The results of the Relex 
calculation for minimum cutsets yield the same results as the Petri net model.  
Using the method discussed in chapter 3, the minimal path sets for Fig. 31 are also solved, as 
shown in Table 10. 
 
Table 12 Minimum Path Set For Airlock System Using The Petri Net Model 
Minimal Path set for Figure 31 
Step 1 X1 Replace X1 
Step 2 X2, X3, D1 Replace X2 
 G1, X3, D1 
E1, X3, D1 
Replace X3 
 G1, X4, X5, D1 
E1, X4, X5, D1 
Replace X4 
 G1, T1, X5, D1 
G1, X6, X5, D1 
E1, T1, X5, D1 
E1, X6, X5, D1 
Replace X6 
 G1, T1, X5, D1 
G1, S1, V1, P1, X5, D1 
E1, T1, X5, D1 







Table 13 Minimum Path Set For Airlock System Using The Petri Net Model (Cont’d) 
Step 3 G1, T1, V1, T2, P2, D1 
G1, S1, V1, P1, V1, T2, P2, D1 
E1, T1, V1, T2, P2, D1 
E1, S1, V1, P1, V1, T2, P2, D1 
Reduce 
Step 4 G1, T1, V1, T2, P2, D1 
G1, S1, V1, P1, T2, P2, D1 
E1, T1, V1, T2, P2, D1 




Figure 32 Relex Qualitative Analysis 
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 From the results obtained from the qualitative analysis, quantitative analysis can be 
performed to calculate the system unavailability Qs (t). From chapter 3 Eqn (3.10), system 




 order cutsets.  
1
st
 order unavailability calculation: 
Qs(t) = 1-[1-Pr{P1}][1-Pr{P2}]…[1-Pr{Pn}] 
where, 
P1 = Pr{D1}, P2 = Pr{P2}, P3 = Pr{T2} and P4 = Pr{V1} 
Qs(t) = 1-[1-Pr{D1}][1-Pr{P2}][1-Pr{T2}][1-Pr{V1}] = 6.813E-09 
2
nd
 order unavailability calculation: 
where,  
P1 = Pr{G1}Pr{E1}, P2 = Pr{T1}Pr{P1} and P3 = Pr{T1}Pr{S1}  
Qs(t) = 1-[1-Pr{G1}Pr{E1}][1- Pr{T1}Pr{P1} }][1- Pr{T1}Pr{S1}] ≈ 0 
Based on the failure rates, the second order unavailability is approximately zero and will 
not affect the overall unavailability of the top event. Third order sets are not required for this 
calculation because the occurrence probability would be even less likely and thus would not 
affect the top event system unavailability. Therefore, the system unavailability of the top event 
occurrence is 6.81E-09. This result is verified by performing the calculation using the same 
failure rates for the constructed fault tree in Fig. 30. It can be shown that these results are 







Table 14 Airlock System Quantitative Analysis Summary 
Quantitative analysis for Figure 31 
1
st
 Order sets 
 
[D1] =  4.50E-09 
[P2] =  1.40E-09 
[T2] =  2.30E-11 
[V1] =  8.90E-10 
Calculation: 






 Order sets [G1, E1] = G1*E1 = 9.00E-20 
[T1, P1] = T1*P1 = 2.90E-18 
[T1, S1] = T1*S1 = 5.08E-19 
Calculation: 
Qs(t) =  
1-[1-Pr{G1}Pr{E1}][1-Pr{T1}Pr{P1}][1-
Pr{T1}Pr{S1}]  




Figure 33 Results of Quantitative Analysis
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Figure 34 Relex Quantitative Analysis 
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4.3 Case Study I: Results and Discussion 
Case study 1 explores the containment boundary system failure for an airlock 
system. The basic events for the system failure are identified. The fault tree and the Petri 
net showing the logical connection of the basic events and the top event, failure to 
maintain pressure boundary, are constructed. The Petri net is modeled in a top-down 
orientation to utilize the tools in chapter 3 to perform qualitative analysis. Both the fault 
tree and the Petri net produce the same results with respect to qualitative and quantitative 
analysis. The qualitative analysis identifies two sets of minimal cutsets, the first order and 
second order. The first order cutsets represent a single basic event, which, if to occur, 
would cause the top event to occur. These basic events include the failure of equipment 
leading to the seals’ failure to inflate (V1, T2, and P2) and the door’s failure to lock (D1), 
which compromises and prevents the airlock system to perform its design function. The 
second order cutsets represent pairs of basic event occurrences that result in system 
failure. This includes the equipment failure which causes seal deflation through the 
failure method of leakage. The other combination for this second order cutset includes the 
failure of the equalizer valve. Once the minimal cutsets have been determined, the 
quantitative analysis can be used to calculate the system unavailability. Each component 
of the system is further reviewed using the FMEA, and failure rates are obtained from 
international databases such as IEEE and IAEA. It is determined that the system 
unavailability is 6.81E-09, which according to [IEC61508], represents an improbable; 
very unlikely to occur event. The results of the quantitative analysis are acceptable as the 
probability of the airlock system failing is minimal. This case study shows that Petri nets 
are an effective tool which can be used to construct and model systems used for PRA. 
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4.4 Case Study II: Maintenance Cooling System 
The maintenance cooling system, which cools the heat transport system from 
177°C to 58.6°C, utilizes separate preheaters for heat rejection. The main heat transport 
pumps circulate heat transport fluid through the preheaters where heat is removed by the 
shutdown cooling system, by circulating light water through the shell of the preheaters. In 
order to operate the main heat transport pumps, it is necessary to keep the heat transport 
system pressurized. Hence, when the shutdown cooling system is in operation, it is not 
possible to open the boiler channel cover for tube sheet inspection or tube plugging to 
service the main heat transport system pump glands or internals, or to carry out 
maintenance on the emergency injection isolating valves. Therefore maintenance cooling 
system is used to provide fuel cooling with the heat transport system depressurized and 
drained to header level.  
The failure of both maintenance cooling system pumps will result in loss of 
coolant flow to the fuel. Both MCS pumps are on Class III power. If Class IV power is 
lost, cooling to the core will be interrupted for four minutes before Class III power is re-
established. This will result in a D2O temperature increase of about 28°C in the channels 
before cooling is restored. If one MCS pump fails, cooling will be provided by the second 
pump. 
If the Primary Heat Transport (PHT) system is open for maintenance, the heat 
transport system D2O level should be maintained so that the fuel is cooled by pool boiling. 
The heat transport system should be closed up, filled, and pressurized as soon as possible 
to assure adequate long term cooling of the fuel if maintenance cooling cannot be 
restored. Maintenance Cooling System reliability consideration has been given to the 
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effects on the PHT system if circulation through the core is interrupted on low level 
operation because of failure in the maintenance cooling system. This is particularly 
important when the heat transport pump is open for maintenance because the heat 
transport system is open to the environment.  
When the station encounters a DBA, there are no Environmental Qualification 
(EQ) requirements for MCS and therefore the actuators do not have an active safety 
function. However, the torque/limit switch compartment contains 48 VDC control 
circuits. Moisture due to accident conditions may produce a ground fault which could 
spuriously operate the actuator. 
Case study II explores the scenario where an electrical connector that functions 
per design can have adverse impact to their respective safety systems. System vibration 
has caused degradation of the control power connector on some applications where Quick 
Disconnect Couplings (QDC’s) were installed for EQ. The system vibration has caused 
wear on the 14-conductor pin-and-socket connector to a point where control power is lost 
or intermittent on some logic circuits in the connector. A replacement connector has been 
proposed and designed, which is a “solid’ connector (there are no pin-and-socket 
connections). This replacement connector will be installed in locations that have been 
found to be susceptible to the system vibration. The scenario will explore the roles of the 
D2O isolation valves within the MCS and how they affect the flow temperature 
This simplified Petri net is constructed, as shown in Fig. 35, to represent the 
output flow temperature of the PHT system during maintenance activities. The MCS is 
engaged and the major events are D2O pump and/or isolation valves operate normally as 
shown in event 2, and pumps and/or isolation valves fail as shown in event 3. The top 
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event ‘T’ of this model is the case where the outflow temperature is high and therefore 
MCS fails to sufficiently cool the heat transport system.  
It should be noted that in Fig. 35, events 2 and 3 are mutually exclusive; event 2 is 
a pump/isolation valve success state, and event 3 is a pump/isolation valve failure state. 
Table 15 PHT Non-Coherent System 
Step 1 T 
Step 2 B,3 
Step 3 1,3 
3’,3 
Step 4 [1,3], [3’, 3] 
 
The procedure to determine the path sets of the system is shown in Table 12. The 
next step is to remove inconsistent path sets from the outputs. In step 4, the only 
inconsistent path set is [3’, 3] because they are mutually exclusive events. Therefore, it 
can be seen that the Set {3’, 3} is inconsistent and the only path set is {1, 3}. 
Top event non-occurrence T’ can also be expressed as:  
 
Where the events 1’ and 3’ are heat transport in service and isolation valve normal, 
respectively. The minimal cutsets can be obtained by taking the complement of the top 
event T’.  
 
Therefore the prime implicants of Fig. 35 are [1] and [3], which means during 
PHT maintenance the failure of the MCS pumps/isolation valves would result in the 
inability to provide adequate cooling.  
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Figure 35 Maintenance Cooling Petri Net 
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4.5 Case Study II: Results and Discussion 
Case study II explores the maintenance cooling system and discusses maintenance and 
outage station window tasks dealing with the PHT. The Petri net model contains a mutually 
exclusive binary event, and using the same approach described in chapter 3 to find minimum 
cutsets, does not always produce the correct results. When the top down methodology is applied 
to Fig. 35, the cutsets produced will be {1, 2} and {3}. This result is not completely accurate 
because the minimum cutset {1} cannot be obtained. The minimum cutset {1} is clearly correct 
to the analyzer and for practical applications and sets {1} and {1, 2} are essentially the same. 
This case study demonstrates the capability of Petri nets to model non-coherent systems. 
Qualitative analysis is performed to yield the prime implicants of {1} and {3}. 
4.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter demonstrates the applications of Petri net as a modeling tool for PRA for the 
airlock system and the MCS in a CANDU nuclear power plant. During a DBA, the airlock 
system has an accredited safety function to maintain pressure boundary. The airlock system is 
constructed and modeled using Petri nets. Qualitative analysis is performed based on the model 
and the results are compared to those based on fault tree analysis. The data for equipment failure 
was obtained from IEEE and IAEA and quantitative analysis for system unavailability were 
performed then verified using traditional methods. Both coherent and non-coherent cases were 
explored to demonstrate the ability of Petri nets to graphically model systems and to provide a 
structured approach for qualitative and quantitative analysis. The two cases have demonstrated 
that PRA modeling can be performed by Petri nets while maintaining the techniques available to 
perform qualitative and quantitative analysis.  
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CHAPTER 5 CONCLUDING REMARKS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
5.1 Concluding Remarks 
A brief history of the need for safety and the chronology of the need for PRA are 
presented. Petri net theory is introduced as an alternative modeling tool for PRA. The thesis 
demonstrates Petri net modeling methods for system failure analysis by making use of logic 
functions. Transformation of existing fault trees into Petri nets is also possible by converting 
logic gates into their equivalent Petri net sets; this bridges the gap between the two modeling 
methods. The Petri net is then used to provide a structured approach for qualitative and 
quantitative analysis of coherent and non-coherent systems. Various examples are provided to 
explore the behaviour of Petri net construction, modeling, and assessments. Also, limitations of 
Petri net simulation are introduced and solutions for modifying Petri net software classes are 
presented. 
 In the case studies, the airlock system is introduced, which has an accredited safety 
function to maintain containment pressure boundary. Through the understanding of Petri net 
construction, we were able to model the system in a structured approach and provide methods for 
assessment. Both qualitative and quantitative analyses are performed to obtain minimum cutsets 
and calculate system unavailability: Qt(s). Also, MCS is introduced in the second case study to 
demonstrate the qualitative analysis for a non-coherent system where the use of the inhibitor arc 
was necessary. This thesis has shown the successful use of Petri nets for PRA in nuclear 
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applications through detailed demonstration of a structured approach to Petri net construction, 
both qualitative and quantitative analysis, and overcoming current Petri net software limitations 
for simulations.  
 
5.2 Future Work 
This thesis studies the traditional Petri net and does not consider repair of failed 
components. Dynamic systems encompass the variables of time, failure, and repairs which more 
accurately describe systems in practice. Petri nets are limited by its software and the 
unavailability of code to model dynamic gates. While it is possible to use basic symbols to model 
dynamic gates, the system would immediately become too large and cumbersome for simulation 
and analysis. The first step to streamlining Petri nets as a viable tool for reliability assessment is 
to develop a software library.  
 It is demonstrated in this thesis that they are also a powerful tool with the ability to 
simulate and model systems to provide a frame by frame account of operation. Once the areas of 
stable software and dynamic conversions are resolved, Petri nets will be able to model and 
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Appendix A: Event Tree Analysis 
 
The ETA method (Event Tree Analysis) is a technique that uses decision trees and 
logically develops visual models of the possible outcomes of an initiating event. It is a graphical 
representation of the logic model that identifies and quantifies the possible outcomes following 
the initiating event [IEEE Std 352, 1987]. In this method, an initiating event such as the 
malfunctioning of a system, process, or construction is considered as the starting point. The 
predictable accidental results, which are sequentially propagated from the initiating event, are 
presented in order graphically.  
ETA is a system model representing system safety based on the safeties of sub-events. It 
is called an event tree because the graphical presentation of sequenced events grows like a tree as 
the number of events increase. An event tree consists of an initiating event, probable subsequent 
events, and final results caused by the sequence of events. Probable subsequent events are 
independent to each other and the specific final result depends only on the initiating event and 
the subsequent events following. Therefore, the occurrence probability of a specific path can be 
obtained by multiplying the probabilities of all subsequent events existing in a path. In an event 
tree, all events in a system are described graphically and it is very effective to describe the order 
of events with respect to time because the tree is related to the sequence of occurrences. In the 
design stage, ETA is used to verify the criterion for improving system performance; to obtain 
fundamental information of test operations and management and to identify useful methods to 
protect a system from failure. The ETA technique is applicable not only to design, construction, 
and operation stages, but also to the change of operation and the analysis of accident causes. The 
modeling limitation of ETA is the inability to accurately model repairs or replacements. A 
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typical event tree (ET) is represented below where the initiating event, seen on the left as 
explosion, has just occurred and the tree grows with each new event. 
 
Figure 36 ETA Model [Rausand & Hoyland, 2003] 
 
The main steps to building an event tree are as follows: 
1. Identify a relevant accident event that may give rise to unwanted consequences 
2. Identify the barriers that are designed to deal with the accident event 
3. Construct the event tree 
4. Describe the resulting accident sequences 
5. Determine the frequency and the probabilities of the branches in the event tree 
6. Calculate the probabilities/frequencies for the identified consequences 
7. Compile and present the results from the analysis 
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Appendix B: Petri Net Interaction Reduction Rules 
Often when dealing with a large system, it is necessary to reduce the system mode to a 
simpler one while preserving the system properties. In this section only the simplest 
transformations are presented [Silva, 1985] [Murata & Koh, 1980].  
 
 Let (N, M0) and (N’, M0’) be the Petri nets before and after one of the following 
transformations. 
 
Figure 37 Fusion of Series Places (FSP) [Murata & Koh, 1980] 
 
 




Figure 39 Fusion of Parallel Transitions (FPT) [Murata & Koh, 1980] 
 
 
Figure 40 Fusion of Parallel Places (FPP) [Murata & Koh, 1980] 
 
 
Figure 41 Elimination of Self-loop Places (ESP) [Murata & Koh, 1980] 
 
 
Figure 42 Elimination of Self-loop Transitions (EST) [Murata & Koh, 1980] 
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Appendix C: Non-coherent System Properties 
 A fault tree is non-coherent if its structure function Φ (x) does not comply with the 
definition of coherence given by the properties of relevance and monotonicity [Barlow & 
Proschan, 1965], [Bendell & Ansell, 1984]. A non coherent Fault Tree will consist of basic 
events which are in a non failed state.  
 
Φ (x) - structure function: defines the system state in terms of the states of the system 
components 
1) Every component i is relevant: Φ(1i, x) ≠ Φ(0i, x)  for some x. 
2) The structure function of component i is monotonically increasing: Φ(1i, x) ≥ Φ(0i, x), for all i 
and x.  
Φ(1i, x) ≡ Φ(x1,...,xi-1, 1, xi+1, ..., xn);  
Φ(0i, x) ≡ Φ(x1,...,xi-1, 0, xi+1, ..., xn).  
 
• Condition #1 ensures that each component contributes to the system state. 
• Condition #2, an increasing (non-decreasing) structure function, ensures that the system state 
deteriorates (or at least does not improve) with an increasing number of component failures. 
Component failures cannot improve the system state. 
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public class Place { 
  protected int tokens ;  
  protected int bound ; 
  protected Boolean bound_state; 
  protected String name ; 
    protected Point coord; 
 
  public Place() { 
    this(0) ; 
  } 
     
  public Place(int t) { 
    this(t,-1) ; 
  } 
   
  public Place(int t, int b, b odelinc) { 
    tokens = t ; 
    bound = b ; 
    bound_state = c; 
    coord = new Point(); 
  } 
 
  public void setName(String name) { 
    this.name = name; 
  } 
 
  public String getName() { 
    return name; 
  } 
 
    public void setCoord(int x, int y) { 
 coord.setLocation(x,y); 








class Arc { 
  public Place place ; 
  public int weight ; 
  public int bound ; 
 
  public Arc(Place p) { 
    this(p,1) ; 
  } 
 
  public Arc(Place p, int w) { 
    place = p ; 
    weight = w ; 
    bound = p.bound ; 






import java.util.HashSet ; 
import java.awt.Point; 
 
public abstract class Transition { 
  protected HashSet in, out ; 
  protected b odelinimmediate ; 
  protected String name ; 
    protected Point coord; 
 
  public Transition() { 
    immediate = true ; 
    in = new HashSet() ; 
    out = new HashSet() ; 
    coord = new Point(); 
  } 
 
    public abstract void onFire() ; 
 
  public void addIn(Place p) { 
    addIn(p,1) ; 
  } 
 
  public void addIn(Place p, int weight) { 
    synchronized(in) { 
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      in.add(new Arc(p,weight)) ; 
    } 
  } 
 
  public void addOut(Place p) { 
    addOut(p,1) ; 
  } 
 
  public void addOut(Place p, int weight) { 
    synchronized(out) { 
      out.add(new Arc(p,weight)) ; 
    } 
  } 
   
  public void setImmediate(b odelinimm) { 
    immediate = imm ; 
  } 
 
  public void setName(String name) { 
    this.name = name ; 
  } 
 
  public String getName() { 
    return name; 
  } 
} 
 
